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Introduction: Seeing oil as a curse 
 
There is an adage about wealth and democracy that says “the more well-to-do a 
nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy.”1  Accordingly, one would 
expect that nations rich in natural resources, and particularly those with large deposits 
of oil – a clear absolute advantage – would shine far beyond all others as beacons of 
democracy and freedom.   
Unfortunately, nothing seems further from the truth.  Among the world’s top ten 
oil exporters, only Norway and Mexico can be realistically described as democracies, 
while three others, Nigeria, Russia, and Venezuela, demonstrate a mere semblance of 
freedom.  Making matters worse, technological advances and energy driven politics are 
forcing major Western consumers to seek out new sources of petroleum.  Reserves are 
increasingly being found, and exploited, in the world’s poorest countries.  Today, oil 
and gas constitute at least thirty percent of total export revenues in some thirty-four less 
developed economies, none of which can be classified as democratic or free.  As 
Martina Ottaway wrote in the New York Times, “oil and democracy do not mix.”2 
Indeed, studies undoubtedly show that oil dependence leads to a skewing of 
political forces.  It concentrates production to geographic enclaves and concentrates 
power into the hands of a few elites.  It becomes a fisherman’s market for rent-seeking 
behavior, where those with money jockey for positions and influence to acquire 
lucrative contracts, the revenues from which are used to further bribe and manipulate 
those in power.  Consequently, those in power secure the positions of their benefactors, 
creating a vicious circle of corruption and patronage, secured from open inspection of a 
free press, public accountability, or standards of international business and political 
practice.   
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Countries that depend on oil for revenue bask in wealth, but overwhelmingly 
suffer what the Economist has called a “poverty of policy.”3  Oil rich states manifest 
some of the greatest inequalities imaginable.  Besides lacking transparency, press 
freedom, and accountability, they tend to have stratified social classes with a tiny 
minority earning millions while a vast portion of the population wallow in abject 
poverty.  Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel Prize winning economist and former chief 
economist of the World Bank called them “rich countries with poor people.”  His 
observation is supported by many the development and economic communities.  
Already ten years ago, Jeffrey Sachs, later to head the U.N.’s millennium development 
project, showed that countries rich in resources grew slower than those without.4   
Adding to Sachs’ thesis, Terry Lynn Karl has shown that the situation is even 
worse than first thought.  Major oil producers such as Algeria, Angola, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Venezuela and even tiny Trinidad Tobago have experienced fundamental 
declines in per capita incomes in recent decades.  In Nigeria, 70% live on less than $1 a 
day in a country that has earned over $340 billion in oil revenues since the 1970s.5 
Why is this happening?  How is it possible to be so rich, yet so poor?  Is this 
phenomenon, known as the “oil curse,” or in social science parlance, the “resource 
curse” truly to blame?  Does oil really impede democracy and economic growth?   
 
The debate 
 
Despite all the empirical evidence pointing to oil as the cause of great misery, 
there are also examples like Norway where oil has not destroyed democracy and 
Indonesia, which has weaned itself away from its negative effects.   
Terry Lynn Karl defines the “resource” or “oil curse” as it is limited here, as 
“the inverse relationship between high natural resources [oil] dependence and economic 
growth rates.”6  If this is true, then indeed oil is a curse.  Supporters of this theory are, 
however, not without their critics.7  For others, like Harvard economist Danni Rodrick, 
Nancy Birdsall and Michael Alexeev, the standards by which oil curse supporters 
calculate economic growth are flawed.  They ask the question: would the economic 
condition be any different in these countries, if they didn’t have oil?8  Interestingly, 
their findings contradict the belief that oil is a curse.   
 _____________________________________________________________________________
© Oil and Gas Business, 2006                                                                 http://www.ogbus.ru/eng/ 
3 
Birdsall and Subramanian point to the fact that Indonesia experienced two 
decades of sustained growth before the 1997 financial crisis, despite Suharto’s 
corruption and cronyism.9  In their work, “The Elusive Curse of Oil,” Alexeev and 
Conrad found that the long-term growth of oil dependent states is in fact positive.  They 
criticize the widely used method of per capita GDP percentages as a basis to judge 
growth over time, pointing out that small countries that initiate oil exports would 
naturally have high ratios of per capita GDP and, hence, skew the statistics 
significantly.  They add that oil producers tend to grow slower over longer periods due 
to the naturally slow growth of oil output, concluding “oil has a positive impact on per 
capita GDP.” 10  
Despite such studies, however, the consensus among development economists, 
political economists, and political scientists is that oil impedes development.  Karl and 
Gary point out that countries dependent on oil as their primary export perform 
significantly worse than other developing economies across a wide range of economic 
indicators.  At the very minimum, they argue, such countries should be faring much 
better given their enormous revenue streams.11  Birdsall adds “throughout history; many 
countries with natural resources have fared worse than ‘poorer’ nations.  In the 
seventeenth century, the Netherlands outdid resource-rich Spain … [despite its gold and 
silver conquests] … Similarly, Japan and Switzerland moved past Russia in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  More recently, resource-poor countries in eastern 
Asia have surged ahead of resource-rich Argentina, Mexico, Nigeria, and Venezuela, all 
of which repeatedly went bankrupt or lapsed into political upheaval.”12  Karl adds in a 
later paper there are “almost no cases of successful development based on the export of 
petroleum.”13 
The arguments against the existence of an oil curse sound reasonable.  The 
picture one draws when looking at oil-dependent countries today, however, is one of 
economic and political instability, conflict, militarization, corruption, poor governance, 
and dramatic inequalities.  Even Birdsall and Subramanian admit oil dependence does 
tend to create significant inequalities.14  Those inequalities lie at the heart of the oil 
curse, occurring at all levels of the political economy of oil-dependent states.   
At first glance, it seems clear that oil and democracy do not mix.  There are, 
however, notable exceptions like Norway, Canada and the United Kingdom that may 
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shed light on this phenomenon.  All three were established democracies before they 
struck oil leading one to believe that path dependence plays a significant role.  It could 
be that countries with strong institutions, rule-of-law and a strong tax system before the 
discovery of oil are better suited to survive the oil curse.  In simple terms, the issue is 
not the oil, but the political and economic system that predated it.  Supporting this line, 
John Judis wrote that unlike the West’s developed democracies, newer oil-states 
avoided going through the arduous process of extracting taxes from a reluctant 
population, granting rights in return, and noted that Libya went from poor to rich 
overnight without any sacrifice from its population.15 
Thus, we can identify the first question to ask when looking at oil-dependent 
states; what was life like before oil?  Until Chad recently started pumping, it had gone 
through almost 30 years of civil war.  Even after discovering oil, it remains one of the 
most corrupt, opaque, and unstable countries in the world.  In Saudi Arabia, long before 
oil, the ruling family depended on tax revenues from the merchant class of Jeddah, an 
income source rendered redundant by oil.  
Kuwait’s economy before oil was based on pearls.  The merchants who fished 
and shipped them abroad paid almost all the taxes that maintained the ruling Al Sabagh 
family.  Not long following the discovery of oil in 1938, the merchants realized they 
were losing influence and demanded distributive rights on the revenues; the Sheikh 
would have nothing of it.  His dependence on pearl taxes was over.  Now there was oil.  
Using his newfound wealth, he disbanded the merchant’s assembly, arrested those who 
opposed him, and ‘poof,’ the pearl merchant class disappeared.  Not long, was too long 
for the merchants.  To consolidate his power, the Sheikh then eliminated taxes, arranged 
jobs for all the merchants, provided free health care and education, essentially buying 
the opposition and making compliance more cost-effective than dissent.16   
The stories of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia seem to show that oil has a tendency to 
hamper democracy, or at least foster the lack of it.  But it would be difficult to argue 
that either the house of Al Sabagh or Saud was ever democratic.  They were, however, 
dependent upon taxation, which in turn forced them to be accountable to at least a larger 
segment of the population than they were after oil became their primary source of 
revenue.  
Some point to the case of Russia, claiming it suffers from the oil curse.  Are 
 _____________________________________________________________________________
© Oil and Gas Business, 2006                                                                 http://www.ogbus.ru/eng/ 
5 
Russia’s problems with democracy connected to its abundance of oil?  William 
Tompson, author of “A Frozen Venezuela” thinks not, arguing that Russia became a 
rent-rich environment the moment it began its transition from Communism.17  Lacking 
regulatory standards and a system of taxation, it jumped into a rapid privatization 
program.18  Moreover, Russia came out of Communism with an enormous bureaucracy, 
a weak state, and virtually no civil society.  Despite since becoming world’s second 
largest oil producer surging 30% in production between 2000 and 2003,19 Russia’s 
economic and social woes can hardly be attributed to oil.  On the contrary, as in the case 
of Norway, Canada, and the U.K., Russia retained the same structural qualities it had 
before becoming a primary oil exporter.  It did not lose a taxation or regulatory regime.  
It simply never had one. 
All of the aforementioned cases show that path dependence plays a significant 
role in determining the impact oil has on a political system.  Where there are structured 
and powerful institutions in place predating oil dependence, the oil curse is less likely to 
take hold.  Where such regimes do not exist, however, oil may very well doom a 
country.  For large countries or solid democracies, this means positive outcomes, or at 
least, few to no devastating structural changes.  For poorer, less developed countries, 
however, the picture is far less rosy. 
 
What about the poor?  How does oil affect them? 
 
If a country is seeking rapid development, to escape the grips of poverty, oil is 
certainly not a blessing.  Oil dependent states have performed 1.7% worse in terms of 
economic growth than non-oil states in recent years.20  The numbers of people living in 
abject poverty in big oil-producing states like Nigeria, Venezuela, and Angola increased 
dramatically over the last 30 years of the twentieth century.21  In short, oil exports as a 
revenue source for development don’t seem to work.  Most countries that have come 
on-line in the last twenty years are exhibiting increased poverty, not less, slower 
growth, not more, weaker institutions, and regulatory frameworks, not stronger.22 
Whether through legal rent-seeking means or illegal methods like corruption, the 
vast infusion of oil wealth and the bad politics it brings tend to hamper economic, 
social, and political development. 
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Culpable in this story is the oil industry itself.  Extracting oil is capital intensive, 
requiring a lot of money and few highly skilled laborers.  For countries lacking both, the 
only source is abroad.  The arrival of foreign oil companies and massive international 
loans creates the perfect rent-seeking environment that quickly imbues itself at every 
level of a nation’s political economy, creating a virtual flee market for corruption, 
patronage and inequality.  In fact, there is virtually no better example for the 
interdependence of politics and economy than that with oil. 
So, what do oil and its money do to a country?  The ramifications are both 
economic and political.  On the economic side, oil dependence and the volatility of oil 
prices on international markets lead to significant fiscal planning, spending problems 
and waste, leading to financial disaster when oil prices collapse.  It also tends to cause 
currency instability, hamper trade liberalization and dramatically reduce the quality of 
public spending.23  The revenue it generates when prices are high tends to cause what is 
known as “Dutch Disease.”  High oil revenues raise exchange rates, promote an adverse 
balance of payments on the cost of imported goods when prices fall, boost wages for 
skilled labor – ultimately pricing them out of the international market - and reduce the 
incentive to risk investment in non-oil sectors.  In short, it kills the competitiveness of 
all non-oil sectors, squeezing out vital sectors like agriculture and manufacturing, 
leaving oil as the only functioning revenue source.  Just one example includes Gabon, 
which since initiating the export of oil has seen its agriculture sector collapse; it is now 
entirely dependent on imported food.24 
By stifling diversification, the economy becomes completely dependent on 
swings in international oil futures.  At $60 a barrel this means wealth, at $10 it is a 
disaster.  Diversification is an essential component to development.  It promotes 
competition, inspires innovation, opportunity and investment, particularly of smaller 
business, the bedrock of a rising middle class.  Just as the pearl merchants of Kuwait 
were squeezed out of their livelihood, countries awash in oil money focus all their 
efforts on a single economic factor.  Along the way, workers increasingly move into oil 
related sectors, if they can.  By failing to diversify their skills, however, they also 
become trapped in a cycle of dependence on oil.  They fail to grow and in the process 
fail to modernize.  Those that do acquire skilled jobs in the oil sector reap the benefits.  
Those that fail or cannot are destined to a life as second or even third class citizens.  
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This lack of labor and capital diversification is the death knell for any developing 
economy. 
The enormous influx of cash resulting from oil revenues tends to foster wasteful, 
overzealous and imprudent projects ranging from man-made rivers to hillside resorts to 
presidential airplanes and massive infrastructure projects;25 the latter, of course, being 
essentially valuable to the development of any country.  Unfortunately, such efforts 
work so long as the price of oil is dramatically higher than the cost of its extraction.  
When the price falls, fiscal budgets go into deficit; countries start taking loans, 
leveraged against their oil reserves, and march unimpeded into debt. 26  Indeed, 
according to Karl, oil states such as Angola, Nigeria and Cameroon have tended to 
borrow faster and deeper than non-oil states to cover unexpected shortfalls in income.27  
Moreover, the massive budgets available to countries exporting oil quickly 
become the source of interest for rent-seeking enterprises.  Winning oil related and 
government contracts becomes the main goal of businesses, perpetuating the dive into a 
staple trap.  In the process, it creates patronage, cronyism, and corruption and 
exacerbates inequalities across the economic and political spectrum.   
It also kills taxes.  For many, such a thought may seem appealing, but the loss of 
tax revenue further skews the government beyond a point of no return.  When 
governments depend on taxes, they require the consent of the governed that holds them 
accountable for their actions, budgets, and ideas.  Thus the loss of tax revenue, rather 
than being a positive, becomes a negative, as the government no longer has an incentive 
to care for the needs or desires of the people.  When oil prices are high and revenues are 
strong, they can and often do setup mechanisms to buy off opposition and contain 
dissent through state employment as Libya reportedly did by employing 75% of the 
population in the late eighties or by financing compliance, as has been the case in Saudi 
Arabia’s support of Wahhabi clerics and their schools.28 
Finally, oil revenues, no matter how high, and no matter how valuable for 
infrastructure construction in its initial stages, tends to be front-heavy and leaves large 
sections of the labor force underemployed causing long-term and massive income 
inequalities.29  The recent production of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline exemplifies this 
point.  At first, thousands of laborers were hired to build the pipeline.  Now in 
production, no more than a few hundred remain on the job, the rest left to migrate from 
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rural, formerly agricultural villages to urban environments where no jobs await them.30 
Together, these forces constitute what Michael Ross31 and others have called the 
“rentier effect,” oil states being “rentier states.”  The rentier state theory argues that 
countries dependent on external rents, like oil, develop a different bond between 
governments and their citizens than those that rely primarily on taxation.  Such states, 
the theory argues, are less likely to be democratic than those that are tax-reliant.32  
Indeed, the twisted economic outcome of oil dependence plays right into the 
hands of bad government and creates a massive imbalance of power.  The economics of 
oil can fundamentally alter the political nature and purpose of the economy.  The rents 
caused by oil are easy for states and elites to appropriate.  Foreign oil companies can 
literally buy influence, and domestic elites can even buy the state.  In cases less severe, 
but no less indicative, politicians may stay “clean” from oil money, but nonetheless 
appropriate it for their own political ends by monopolizing oil and thus power, a charge 
often raised against Venezuela’ Hugo Chavez and Russia’s Vladimir Putin.33 
 
Oil and the political environment 
 
As mentioned previously, leaders accustomed to oil wealth have no need for 
taxation.  Thus, they have no need for the population, or their property, political, or civil 
rights.  Spending on public welfare is reduced from a matter of necessity based on 
accountability to an act designed to demobilize opposition.  In case after case, from 
Saudi Arabia to Venezuela it seems to work. 
Many oil dependent states manifest similar political qualities.  There is a 
noticeable lack of accountability, which results from and gives rise to massive 
corruption with political leaders staying in power for decades or becoming presidents 
for life.  Kickbacks, bribery, and patronage are rampant.  Weak institutions and poor 
governance are the result.  Wealth is distributed quickly and unevenly among elites 
leaving the poor to naturally question their status.  Such inequalities, exposed and 
exacerbated by oil wealth, coupled with an unequal distribution of power and a 
detached, disinterested government create an explosive expectation-gap among the 
population.  Visible in illiteracy rates, education and health standards, such inequalities 
become the fuel for insurrections, uprisings, and civil wars.  In response to such forces 
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as well as to simply secure their own positions, oil dependent governments and the 
elites which run them place an inordinate amount of resources in military and security 
spending.  In the process, democracy is the first casualty.  Well-to-do nations may be 
able to sustain democracies, but well-to-do nations that lack one, are not likely to get 
one.   
According to Ross, the oil-impedes-democracy argument is “both valid and 
statistically robust” and tends to be stronger the poorer a country is, even when exports 
are small.34  A quick observation substantiates his thesis.  Equatorial Guinea, brought to 
western televisions through a failed coup attempt organized by Margaret Thatcher’s son 
Mark, found oil in the early 1990s.  While the vast majority of the population lives in 
abject poverty, the president, his family, and his close friends bask in wealth.  There are 
neither political debates nor daily newspapers.35  The country ranks seventh from last on 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (TICPI).36  In Kazakhstan, a 
third of the population lives under $1 a day, while its autocratic president is the richest 
man in the country.37  In Angola, where 90% of government revenues come from oil 
and two thirds of the population have no access to clean water, a recent IMF audit 
revealed that $4.2 billion in oil revenues went missing between 1996 and 2001.  When 
asked, the Angolan government allegedly replied that it was an accounting error; it had 
simply lost the receipts.38  Angola and Kazakhstan rank 151 and 107 respectively on the 
TICPI.39  In fact, most oil-dependent countries rank near the bottom in the World 
Bank’s Voice and Accountability Index.40 
Governments that lack accountability are breeding grounds for corruption and 
foster a nasty cycle of weakened institutions, patronage and poor governance, which in 
turn fosters even more corruption.  Once unleashed, these forces are difficult if not 
impossible to rein in.  Corrupt governments tend to have extensive staying power.  
Zaire’s President Mobuto Sese Seko stayed in power for 32 years, form 1965 to 1997.  
The Aliyev family of Azerbaijan turned the former Soviet republic into a hereditary 
autocracy.  In Saudi Arabia, some 10,000 royal family members receive monthly 
stipends of between $800 and $270,000.41  According to Ross, patronage programs have 
become one of the primary tools that corrupt government use to minimize popular 
dissent.42 
No matter how successful such governments have been in reducing demands for 
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reform, however, in many cases the heightened expectations of the population cannot be 
overcome.  In oil-dependent states (as opposed to non-oil-dependents), nutrition is often 
low, child mortality high, life expectancy is lower, literacy rate increases slower, and 
lower school-enrolment rates are the norm.43 
In contrast to these facts, however, stands the spirit of the poor who hope that oil 
will bring jobs, schools, food, healthcare, and housing.  Unfortunately in Chad, no such 
dreams have come true.  Mbangtoloum Ngaramdй, a Chadian farmer from the village of 
Kayrati told National Geographic recently, “They said the majority of us would get rich, 
but we have just got poorer.  Nothing good has come from the oil.”44  Mbangtoloum 
will be lucky if he survives another harvest; life expectancy in Chad is 48, AIDS and 
Malaria are sweeping the country; another prize of its newfound oil wealth.  
This incongruence of development is so spectacular in some countries it is no 
wonder that they have had, continue to have, or will fall victim to conflict.   
These conditions, from the money, corruption and weak institutions to the 
extreme poverty and rampant inequality, lead rulers already detached from 
accountability to their citizens to invest in the one area that will best perpetuate their 
own power, namely security.  In Iran, the Shah used oil to finance a brutal security 
service; his theological successors replaced it with one of their own.  Iraq, under 
Saddam Hussein spent a fortune of his country’s oil wealth to build a repressive regime 
dedicated to holding on to power, as occurred in Nigeria, Angola and more recently in 
Venezuela.  Since coming to power, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez has 
“systematically removed all checks and balances central to democracy – concentrating 
power in his own hands” according to the Economist.45  He has undermined property 
rights, placed curbs on private business, and instead of diversifying his country with its 
vast oil wealth, he has instead focused on promoting his “Bolivarian revolution,” 
centered on state control of oil resources.  Making matters worse, the Chavez 
government is increasingly militarizing public administration and decision-making, 
ordering new laws restricting press freedom by prohibiting “disrespect for government 
authorities.”46 
Chavez is not alone in his ways.  Both Christian Aid and Karl point to 
tendencies among oil-dependent states to spend a considerably higher share of GDP, 
between two and ten times, on military and police than non-oil states and have armies 
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consisting on average of 2.6% of the population as opposed to 1% in non-oil dependent 
countries.47  It is, therefore, no surprise that oil-dependent countries tend to be more 
militaristic, have stronger security forces and find themselves engaged in more conflicts 
than states not in possession of such resource wealth; and it is also not uncommon to 
find oil-rich states engaged in “enclave wars” over oil, at home or along their borders.48   
Whether the goal is keep the public demobilized, secure its oil assets, settle 
disputes over them, or to preserve the self-interest and power of a country’s elites, oil-
dependent countries tend to be highly militarized, and those militaries tend to be among 
the most robust institutions found in the country.  Oil wealth has been used by Sudan, 
Algeria, Nigeria, Yemen, and Indonesia in Aceh to prolong conflicts.49 In fact, when oil 
wealth is concentrated in secessionist areas, the likelihood for a prolonged and bloody 
war skyrockets.  Oxford’s Paul Collier suggests that the phenomenon of oil-fueled wars 
is particularly acute in Africa, where he says there is a 25% chance for such conflicts in 
oil-dependent states as opposed to 1% in those lacking oil.50 
Looking at the numbers surrounding oil, the poor performance oil-dependent 
states demonstrate in accountability, transparency, corruption, diversification, fiscal 
practices, militarization, authoritarianism, poverty, and inequality, one can only 
conclude that oil is indeed more often than not a curse. 
 
Are oil dependent states truly doomed? 
 
The numbers don’t tell the whole story.  There are examples of countries that 
broke the oil curse and others that avoided it altogether.  The latter group consists 
predominantly of states that were already democracies long before oil came along.  
These states had years, even centuries to develop robust institutions to protect against 
corruption, patronage, and self-aggrandizing fiscal imprudence.  Among them are the 
United States, United Kingdom, Norway, and Canada.  Another group, however, has 
successfully moved from oil cursed to oil blessed.  These include Indonesia, Mexico 
and to a great extent the small emirate of Dubai.  Dubai’s economy has tripled over the 
last ten years.  Since the mid-1990s, it has been using its oil receipts to build world-
class holdings, including funds and companies currently worth over $15 billion.51  The 
country is growing at 16% per year and oil, once its primary source of income, is now 
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around 6% of its GDP.  Its successes are not limited to economics either.  Dubai is the 
only Arab emirate to have a woman serving as its Minister of Economy.52  What is the 
key to Dubai’s success?  In a word, diversification.  Unlike so many other oil-dependent 
sates, Dubai diversified its economy and spread its wealth, through the process, to more 
of its citizens.  As a result, democracy is seeping in; transparency is on the rise, ranking 
not far behind Japan and Spain and ahead of Italy, Hungary, and South Korea according 
to Transparency International.53 
Dubai has company too.  According to the Economist, “Mexico has successfully 
diversified its economy in recent years reducing oil exports as a share of GPD to under 
10%.”54  Indonesia had diversified its economy before the first oil crisis of 1973 and 
successfully increased its manufacturing base between 1970 and 1999 from 1.2% to 
54% of GDP reducing its oil share of exports by 30% over the same period, now at 
under one third.55  This is directly opposed to Algeria, which has seen its manufacturing 
base drop from 6.7% to 2.8% over the same period and Venezuela, of which oil 
constituted 80% of its exports in 1999.56  Three decades ago, Indonesia and Nigeria had 
comparable per capita incomes, both economies primarily based on oil.  Today, 
Indonesia’s is four times that of Nigeria’s.57  That is the power of diversification. 
 
Beyond diversification 
 
Dubai, Mexico and Indonesia along with their fully developed counterparts to 
the North offer optimism to the curability of the oil curse.  Unfortunately, the oil curse 
is not solely a domestic matter.  For a country to diversify it requires a domestic 
decision, but involves cooperation abroad.  The influence wielded by large 
multinational oil corporations like Shell and BP, industrialized consumers like the 
United States and rising stars like China can and do play a determining role in the 
domestic development of an oil dependent economy.   
The United States, as the world’s largest consumer, has spent a great deal of its 
own resources over the last decades, literally in blood and money, to keep oil flowing 
smoothly to itself and its allies.  In the process, it has funded authoritarian governments 
with aid and weapons to militarize and perpetuate their smooth rule, in what one author 
called a “see no evil position.”58  Despite obvious inequalities, the U.S. is currently 
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investing heavily in African oil.  China too, in its own pursuits for energy has acquired 
oil assets in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.  Its stake in Sudan is 
significant and when the issue of Darfur recently came before the U.N. Security 
Council, China threatened a veto, forcing the watering-down of the resolution.59  The 
same forces are at play in Iran.  Add to these national interests, those of the international 
finance community, which sees investments in extractive industries as one of their most 
lucrative portfolios, and you have and international community that promotes the 
retched curse of oil. 60 
Current efforts to promote greater transparency and anti-corruption initiatives 
like the Publish What You Pay movement and the voluntary Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) have yet to make any significant dent in oil-related 
corruption.  Other programs that establish rainy-day funds are in existence in a number 
of places, from Norway to Chad to Venezuela and Iran.  However, all of them have 
been raided at one time or another by their respective governments for purposes other 
than rainy-day needs.  According to Birdsall, Venezuela has changed the rules on how 
to spend its oil fund money six times in the last few years.  Oil funds are supposed to 
take revenues from a depleting source and save it for future generations.  Unfortunately, 
such a large amount of saved cash seems too enticing for countries to resist. 
That leaves dividends.  Alaska regularly pays out shares of interest earned on its 
oil to its residents, in what can only be called an oil dividend.  Such a solution for the oil 
curse seems attractive.  In a poor country, it could allow for a healthy transfer of wealth 
from rich to poor, without shaking up the national political environment too rapidly.  
Distributing wealth in this manner, say in the form of a few thousand dollars per year, 
would foster small business and consumption.  It would help create a tax base and could 
serve to raise many countries out of the throws of desperate poverty.  Alas, in most poor 
countries, citizens lack bank accounts, making such distribution impossible, or yet 
another source for corruption.  Institutions are needed.  Unfortunately, such institutions 
can only be created by those elites who caused the problem in the first place.   
Sadly, despite all the good ideas, those in power in oil dependent countries have 
no incentive to forfeit any of the wealth or authority they possess.  In fact, they tend to 
stay in power for decades, and with each passing year, corruption, and patronage 
increase adding to the cycle of dependence.  Strangely, some may see the staying power 
 _____________________________________________________________________________
© Oil and Gas Business, 2006                                                                 http://www.ogbus.ru/eng/ 
14 
of elites in these countries as a blessing, if one can call it that; as long as they remain, 
there is stability, a matter considered of great importance to the world’s oil consumers.   
Nevertheless, sometime in a not too distant future, oil will disappear.  When it 
does, stability will end.  Those countries that have diversified will move forward.  
Those that do not, however, will collapse economically and politically.    
Meanwhile, the oil curse remains just that, a curse.   
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